Montreal Canadiens GM Makes Brutal Admission on the Current State Management and Rebuild Process

As our “State Of The Rebuild” series draws to a finish, we must look at one last, important component before moving on to the overall grades assigned to the Montreal Canadiens in several departments: team management.

State of the Montreal Canadiens Rebuild Series: Published

• Draft Capital
• Goaltending Prospects
• Forward Prospects
• Defensive Prospects
• NHL Forwards
• NHL Goaltenders
• NHL Defencemen
• Trade Grades – Part One
• Trade Grades – Part Two

An Unique Start
Before appointing a new general manager, owner Geoff Molson made the wisest move in deciding his squad needed a new direction: he added a crucial element of control.

Though I think adding Jeff Gorton as executive vice president of Hockey Operations was maybe the most significant adjustment made to the organisation, Kent Hughes deserves most of the credit for the reforms in Montreal.

It was him that recommended the team update both the development programme and its data analysis system.

Given his twin responsibilities as executive vice president and general manager, Marc Bergevin faced little to no resistance inside the company during his tenure.

Molson was the only one who could make him answer for his actions, but the Canadiens owner has a history of openly trusting the individuals he appointed to manage his organisation. That seems like a fairly sensible strategy most of the time. The way Molson has managed the Canadiens might teach a lot of franchise owners around the world of sports. Better still is to hear from an owner as little as possible.

But when long-term staff members exhibit little or no desire for innovation, a lack of accountability unavoidably creates a culture of indifference.

The Canadiens now have not only more control but also a highly experienced executive in Hughes, providing them with a strong blend of unadulterated energy and hockey knowledge.

 

Communication Is Key
We recently discussed how Bergevin’s boisterous and affable personality was slowly but surely replaced with domineering behaviour that led to a bevy of awkward contract negotiations, not to mention an ugly divorce with many of the team’s legends, including two members of the Montreal Canadiens Holy Trinity, Guy Lafleur and Mr. Jean Béliveau.

But the transformation did not happen overnight

There’s a reason Bergevin aged faster than Barack Obama during that time frame.

Serving as the general manager of the Montreal Canadiens is one of the most difficult professions in the city, country, and probably even the globe. This doesn’t exonerate poor behaviour, but it helps explain why Bergevin became a little more jaded every time he had to face with the media.

Originally, Bergevin was described as a superb communicator, a notable break from Pierre Gauthier’s management approach. He was also praised for his honesty, but another issue that had plagued the team during Gauthier’s tenure.

After over a decade on the job, the transparency was non-existent and communication went the way of the Tasmanian Tiger.

With that in mind, it will be interesting to observe how Gorton and Hughes negotiate the human and public relations aspects of the job once the pressure starts to grow.

The last two years have been the easiest part.

We do have to give them full scores for presenting a clear roadmap to success, at least generally speaking. They have not treated supporters like simpletons that would have a tough time grasping what a proper rebuild requires.

While Bergevin exploited the fans as an excuse to avoid pulling things down to the studs, Hughes, for the most part, has been honest as to the problems the team may encounter as they cross the turbulent seas of rebuilding a professional sports franchise.

You might even argue Hughes and Gorton have been honest to a fault, but that would be quite the nit to pick considering the improvements they have put into place in the last two seasons.

Possible Reactions
From an asset management perspective, Hughes and Gorton have largely escaped the usual traps, with the exception of a few dubious moves (or none at all in the instance of the three-headed monster that haunted the crease the whole season).

However, they did not take advantage of the chance that arose when Josh Anderson started drawing interest from NHL teams. Instead of giving in when his stock was at an all-time high, they persisted in their demands. One of two things would happen: either a team would overpay for his services, or they would be content to have him around.

Hughes’ strategy made reasonable because he had nearly all the negotiating power, but it was also a risk because asset values fluctuate a lot during a season.

A risk that he failed at

The saying “you have to strike while the iron is hot” is true; Hughes proved this when he dealt Sean Monahan to the Winnipeg Jets in return for a first-round selection.

You may also argue that he didn’t handle the Jake Allen situation very well. When there was no justification, Hughes not only extended Allen’s term early but also included a no-trade clause in his contract.

Later in the season, Allen would use that clause to block a trade with the New Jersey Devils. He was eventually traded by the Habs to the Devils for a middling draft pick, but the resolution of a dispute that arose prior to training camp came right up to the last minute of the trade deadline.

In exchanges with Tyler Toffoli and Artturi Lehkonen, he likewise received subpar returns, though it would be difficult to argue that he was defrauded in either scenario. The Canadiens have generally benefited from Hughes’ transactions in the near and long terms.

Ultimately, the addition of right-handed defensemen to the team was a source of some degree of obsession. To be fair, there is a limited supply of right-handed talent available each season, thus the team did lack choices on the right side of the blue line. Although the team may have overreached in trying to strengthen the weak point, given the position’s significance, this was a reasonable course of action.

Though their work is far from done, Gordon and Hughes of the Montreal Canadiens Brass Tacks have been a much-needed breath of fresh air for a team that has spent the greater part of the last two decades resting on its laurels.

The most critical problem the squad is currently facing—a glaring deficiency of elite forward talent—has not yet been resolved.

That is not to suggest that they haven’t strengthened the team with some key additions. Kirby Dach and Alex Newhook were both good acquisitions, but it’s too soon to say that either will significantly alter the course of the game given Dach’s health concerns and Newhook’s defensive shortcomings.

While passing on Matvei Michkov did not spell doom for the Canadiens in the long run, selecting a right-handed defenceman at the fifth overall choice rather than a top offensive prospect may come back to haunt them if they are unable to address their offensive problems.

Luckily, the Habs will have the ideal chance to address the lack of quality up front in 2024, when Hughes and company will select a club among the top 5 in the NHL for the third consecutive year.

As a result, it can be their final pick at that level, which increases the pressure on the management team to choose the best player who also happens to match a clear organisational requirement.

To put it simply, if teams (apart from Vegas) want to be taken seriously as Stanley Cup contenders in the future, they must succeed with their top draft picks.

Since taking control, Hughes has added a significant amount of draft capital to the team, but the chances of ever winning the Lord Stanley Cup will rapidly diminish if Juraj Slafkovsky, David Reinbacher, and whoever else they select this summer don’t develop into top players.